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THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY: ETHNICITY AND THE 
ECONOMY OF POWER IN IRON AGE NORTHWEST 
IBERIA 
 
ABSTRACT. 
Since the beginning of archaeology as a scientific discipline, Iron Age archaeologists in 
the Iberian Peninsula have been concerned with the characterisation of ethnic groups. 
The Iberian panorama is not dissimilar to that of other archaeological traditions in 
Europe, except that the focus on ethnicity has survived with remarkable strength up to 
the present day. Traditional concepts of ethnicity remain largely unchallenged: many 
scholars, following deep-rooted culture-historical assumptions, consider that the groups 
transmitted by ancient writers are more or less directly mirrored in the archaeological 
record, through particular styles of pottery, weapons, architecture and other elements of 
material culture. It will be argued here that it is necessary to problematise the idea of 
ethnicity in Iron Age Iberia by considering the role of politics, the influence of ancient 
authors in our own perception of ethnic groups, and the multifarious nature of identity. 
Through the exploration of the case of northwestern Iberia and drawing upon an array of 
modern anthropological examples, I will show the difficulties of delineating such 
groups as the “Gallaecians” and “Asturians”, by tracing the real diversity concealed 
under these overarching terms, and proving the necessity to take political and moral 
economies into account in order to understand identity at large. 
 
FROM ETHNICITY TO POLITICS.  
This chapter is divided in two parts: in the first one I will address some general issues in 
relation to ethnicity, identity and politics. In the second part the situation of 
northwestern Iberia during the Middle and Late Iron Age (400 BC – 50 AD) will be 
examined  
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Studying identity, forgetting politics. 
Until the 1960s, archaeologists tended to interpret all spatial variations in material 
culture (what we could call style) from the perspective of ethnicity. Presumably, a 
different way of decorating a pot, designing a fibula or making a spear would be cultural 
manifestations—conscious as well as unconscious—of a particular ethnic identity. For 
archaeologists studying the European Iron Age in particular, ethnicity was, and to a 
large extent still is, an extremely flexible concept: it may refer to large and diffuse 
groups which could not have possibly shared any sense of common identity, such as the 
Celts or the ancient Germans, and minor communities transmitted by classical authors, 
such as the Aeduans or the Daunians. Since the birth of processual archaeology, the 
rather crude culture-historical visions of ethnicity have been subjected to a strong 
critique in the Anglo-Saxon tradition (Jones 1997). Archaeologists have problematised 
the concept of ethnic identity first by denying a one-to-one relationship between 
material culture and ethnicity, and later by incorporating group and individual identities 
to the equation: gender, sex, age, status, race and other variables affect the way ethnicity 
is lived, negotiated and displayed (Jones 1997; Díaz-Andreu et al. 2005; see Wells 
[1998] for a nice application to the European Iron Age).  
While concepts of ethnicity were becoming increasingly varied, complex and 
sophisticated in Anglo-Saxon archaeology, other traditions either rejected the debate—
e.g. Germany after the traumatic experience of Nazism (Brather 2000)—or kept 
entrenched in culture-historical assumptions, despite an occasional processual varnish. 
The latter situation applies chiefly to Spanish, Portuguese and Italian archaeology (e.g. 
Molinos and Ziffereri 2002). In the Spanish case, the archaeology of the “Celtic” Iron 
Age continues to be driven by a “palaeoethnological” agenda which seeks to 
characterise ethnic groups by combining information provided by classical authors and 
material culture. This approach, originally developed by Bosch Gimpera (1920), persists 
to our days scarcely challenged (cf. Almagro and Ruiz Zapatero 1992). A list of recent 
doctoral dissertations read at the Complutense University of Madrid proves the case: the 
Celtiberians (Lorrio 1997), the Vettons (Álvarez Sanchís 1999), the Lusitanians (Martín 
Bravo 2000), the Tartessians (Torres Ortiz 2002), the Callaecians (González-Ruibal 
2006-2007) with two others forthcoming, one about the Asturians and another on the 
Cantabrians. Generally speaking, this is still an “archaeology of identification” (Ruby 
2006: 47), characterised by the intention to match archaelogical material culture and 
classical texts where “ethnic groups” are defined.   
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The explanation for this scientific anomaly is manifold: on the one hand, the 
destruction of Spanish universities after the civil war (1936-1939) (Claret Miranda 
2006) favoured the persistence of old paradigms and a strong parochialism, which far-
reaching consequences. Besides, this new academia was heavily influenced by the 
nationalist rhetoric of the period, which draw upon archaeology and history to define 
Spanish ethnic identity (Díaz-Andreu 1997). There are, however, other reasons to 
explain the modern survival of old concepts of ethnicity: their strong popular appeal. 
The lay public considers that the Iron Age is not like any other period in prehistory—or 
history, for that matter. They saw the deep roots of their present identity in pre-Roman 
groups. Archaeological debates—such as those concerning the Celtic character of this or 
that Iron Age culture—usually transcend universities and are replicated in more popular 
arenas—a good case in point is the harsh debate generated by the publication of Carlos 
Marín Suárez’ (2005) essay on the notion of Astur. This is in part due to the fact that the 
ethnic names transmitted by ancient authors coincide quite accurately with modern 
regions and place names—e.g. Callaecia, Galicia; Asturia, Asturias; Cantabria, 
Cantabria; Vasconia, País Vasco; etc. It is not strange to hear somebody defining her or 
himself as an Astur or Callaica or more generally, a Celt (as opposed to the non-Celtic 
Iberians of Andalusia and the Spanish Levant). Coincidences between past and present 
“ethnicities” are more obvious in northern Spain, where nationalist and regionalist 
feelings are stronger (Marín Suárez 2005). The same mechanism of identification 
between past and present ethnicity was used before 1975 during Franco’s dictatorship 
(Díaz-Andreu 1997), in this case with centripetal purposes: thus, Spaniards were 
deemed to be the descendants of the Celtiberians, a mixture of Iberians and Celts (Ruiz 
Zapatero 1993, 2003). Spanish archaeologists often complain that archaeological 
research is misused and put at the service of disparate, often undemocratic and racist, 
political agendas. However, the problem is ingrained in the very paradigm they use 
blissfuly—a paradigm which equates ancient ethnicity, territory and material culture.   
Compared to the situation in other parts of Europe, the developments of Anglo-
Saxon research in relation to ethnicity are laudable and exciting—also those of 
Scandinavian archaeology (Olsen 1985). Still, too much attention paid to identity has 
concealed other issues that are fundamental in explaining why material culture varies 
from one community to another. Among the things that explain the spatial variability of 
material culture is politics. This has been generally overlooked by postprocessualist 
archaeologists, which are more interested in individuals and agency than in structure 
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and collective ethoi (McGuire and Wurst 2002; Patterson 2005). Also, the emphasis on 
culture and the symbolic realm has precluded a serious exploration of politics, which are 
usually reduced to the postmodern politics of identity or to the use of past ethnicity in 
current political agendas—especially nationalism (Díaz-Andreu and Smith 2001). In 
this chapter, I argue for another sort of “politics of identity”: not those that emphasise 
postmodern sensibilities as shaped by concepts of multiculturalism, minority rights and 
individual freedom, but the politics that take power, hegemony, ideology and economy 
at its heart. However, it is not a materialist perspective that is espoused here. Rather, I 
would like to bridge the gap between the North American archaeological tradition 
focused on politics, economy and grand narratives, and the European tradition 
concerned with critique, sociocultural and symbolic aspects and the local.  
I will illustrate my points with reference to the northwest of Iberia during the 
Middle and, especially, Late Iron Age. The northwest of the Iberian Peninsula is a large 
and diverse region (ca. 50,000 square km), which the Romans divided into two areas 
after the conquest: Callaecia and Asturia. Archaeologists and historians have assumed 
those terms to be ethnic names describing large cultural groupings. Through a closer 
look at material culture and politics, I will show that reality is much more complex—
and interesting.   
The politics of ethnicity: anthropological lessons.   
Most definitions of ethnic group emphasise cultural, apparently arbitrary, elements 
(language, dress, customs, beliefs). For Sîan Jones (1997: 84), ethnic groups have to 
share both a (perceived) common origin and a common culture. Jonathan Hall (2002: 9) 
places all the relevance in self-identification, but still considers “language, religion or 
cultural traits” as “secondary indicia”. Barth (1976: 11) considers both self-
identification and cultural values as relevant criteria for identifying ethnic groups.  
 For understanding identity, however, we have to look at politics also and 
particularly at the intersection between politics, economy and ethnicity. For several 
decades now, anthropologists have been providing thought-provoking examples of 
societies whose ethnicity is entangled in a complex mesh of social and political 
premises. Most anthropological studies explore the relationship between ethnic groups, 
nationalism, federalism, modernity and the state (Anderson 1991; Smith 1992), and are 
therefore of limited use for archaeologists. Nevertheless, some authors working with 
non-modern communities have been able to prove that many ethnic labels have been 
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assigned historically on grounds other than purely cultural and that cultural elements are 
deeply interwoven with political and economic ones. In what follows, I would mention 
briefly a few eloquent ethnographic examples. 
 Southeast Asia presents a remarkable panorama in the complex entanglement of 
ethnicity and politics. Scott (1998: 186) considers that it is useful here to talk about state 
spaces and non-state spaces to define the intersection of identity and politics. In the first 
spaces, population is densely settled, communities are permanent and an important 
surplus of staple foods is produced. Non-state spaces are characterised by a sparse 
settlement, shifting cultivation and mobility. Non-state spaces are considered as 
exemplars of rudeness, disorder, and barbarity by the centres. It is obvious that this 
political-economic geography affects ethnicity and the way collective identity is 
constructed. A good example is provided by Laos and Thailand (Izikowsky 1976; 
Turton 2000): the people from the lowlands (the Thai) have been traditionally an 
aristocratic society organised as a city-based state and long-distance trade networks 
have played a relevant role in their political economy. They despised the highlanders, 
whom they call Kha, meaning “servant”, “slave” (Turton 2000: 6). The so-called Kha 
were small-scale societies of slash-and-burn agriculturalists, living in dispersed small 
villages and endowed with egalitarian ethics. Ethnic terms in this area are not just a 
cultural label, but also a mark of status: the Kha were politically subdued to the Thai, to 
whom they had to pay taxes.  
 A similar situation exists in several places in Africa. The Mandara Highlands of 
Cameroon are settled by groups—collectively known as Montagnards—organised on 
more egalitarian lines than those of the plains—the Wandala—with whom they are 
nonetheless historically and genealogically related (McEachern 1993). The Wandala 
have been organised traditionally as states, have been involved in long-distance trade 
networks and have raided the highlanders frequently. Both Montagnards and Wandala 
defined their ethnic identities in opposition to the other, even if their economies and 
livelihoods depended on the other. In the Sudan-Ethiopian borderland, the situation was 
not very different, with Nilo-Saharan communities being raided by Arabs and 
Abyssinians. Both perceived the non-state space of their frontier as inhabited by unruly 
and uncivilised peoples, whom they called “slaves”: Abid, Shankilla (Pankhurst 1977). 
As the Montagnards in relation to the Wandala, the identity of these rather egalitarian 
communities was constructed in opposition to their neighbour’s economies of power. 
Rather than two distinct groups, as in Thailand and Cameroon, what we have in the 
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Ethiopian borderland is a gradation: the interaction and, in some cases, miscegenation 
of the frontier communities with representatives of other, more hierarchical cultures, 
produced a variety of “ethnic groups”. Charles Jedrej (2004: 720) considers that in this 
region “the names of ethnic groups are less likely to indicate different ways of life and 
more likely to mark positions in a ranking of status and prestige… So Ja’alayin, 
Watawit, Jabalawiin, Funj, Hamaj, Berta, and Burun come to represent points on scales 
between urban and rural, Muslim and pagan, superior and inferior, and master and 
slave…”. Finally, a nice example of the politics behind ethnicity is provided by 
Madagascar (Graeber 2004: 54-59). The present Sakalava were, originally, the subjects 
of a particular royal dinasty. Those who refused to be subjugated to the kings fled to a 
hilly backward country and became the Tsimihety, meaning “those who do not cut their 
hair” (cutting one’s hair was a symbol of loyalty during the funerals of a king). “The 
Tsimihety—says Graeber (2004: 55)—are now considered a foko—a people or ethnic 
group—but their identity emerged as a political project”. The same occurs elsewhere in 
the island (Graeber 2004: 57-58). When the French arrived an re-organised the peoples 
that they found in “tribes” (i.e. ethnic groups), following the usual colonial procedure, 
they resorted to the most conspicuous elements of distinction. These were usually 
political, althought they were expressed in what we would call now the language of 
ethnicity. Like the Sakalava, the Merina were the subjects of a powerful royal dinasty. 
The peoples conquered by the Merina were called Betsileo. Those who refused state 
rule, apart from the Tsimihety, were the Vezo (a fisher-folk), the Tanala (forest 
dwellers) and the Mikea (hunter-gatherers). As in Sudan and Ethiopia, we have a 
gradation of peoples, reified as ethnic groups, who cover the spectrum from total 
compliance with the state, to total rejection.   
 I will try to prove here that for understanding the diversity of material culture 
and landscapes in the northwest of Iberia during the Late Iron Age we have to look also 
at different articulations of politics, which created different kinds of oppositions and 
enabled the emergence of disparate collective identities. My point is that, in the 
fragmented cultural panorama of Callaecia and Asturia, there existed communities 
where political economies, which allowed the production of inequalities and 
hierarchisation, were at work, and others where moral economies, which emphasised 
egalitarian values and a collective ethos, prevailed. To complicate the panorama even 
more, some communities were organised as centralised polities and others rejected 
state-like political systems. These different economies of power strongly shaped 
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material culture and landscape. The resulting regional differences, allied to other 
cultural idiosincrasies, were played out in material culture and were transmitted by 
classical authors through a diversity of oppositions (Celtici / Helleni; Bracarenses / 
Lucenses; Transmontani / Cismontani), which modern scholars have tended to interpret 
in squarely ethnic, geographical or cultural terms. Ruby (2006: 59) considers that the 
political side of ethnicity has to be studied, but archaeology is quite useless to this 
regard. My intention is to prove that archaeology, too, may have something to say when 
it comes to politics.   
Political and moral economies, past and present.   
I regard both political and moral economies in a Foucaldian sense as economies of 
power, that is, historically-specific ensembles of power relations. Foucault placed great 
emphasis on the relations of power through which subjects are produced (Foucault 
1982): this approach is then pertinent for a research on identity (ethnic, gender, sexual, 
racial or other). The main difference between political and moral economies is that the 
former provide the bases for the structural generation of inequalities, while the later 
deploy mechanisms to hinder them. The way subjects are produced under these different 
regimes of power are therefore different and so are collective identities.  
 The term political economy, as it is well known, is a vintage Enlightenment 
concept, which was originally equated to what we now call simply economy. Today in 
archaeology it refers usually to the intertwining of politics and economy in those 
societies were economy transcends the limits of the household (e.g. Feinman 2002: 2). 
We can say that political economies are a set of practices and strategies, both 
ideological and material, that provide the framework for the production and 
reproduction of inequalities in a given society. The presence of this concept in 
archaeology is certainly not new: it was incorporated to the conceptual apparatus of the 
discipline by processual archaeology. Although in Europe the concept has been scarcely 
applied, it has been very succesful in the United States, where political economy is 
strongly associated with the general concern for complex societies, the emergence of 
inequalities, state-formation, and the role of economy in processes of hierarchisation 
(Earle 1997; Feinman and Nicholas 2002). Political-economic strategies mobilised by 
political actors include patron/client relationships, tribute, political gifting, prestige-
goods systems, esoteric and specialised knowledge, long-distance trade networks, 
aristocratic ancestor worship, control of instruments of war, attachment of craft 
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specialists, competitive feasting, production and management of surplus, etc.—for 
examples of these strategies at work cf. Helms (1988), Earle (1997), Blanton (1998), 
Stanish (2002). These mechanisms are utilised by elite groups, aristocratic individuals 
or households to increase and maintain their power.  
 Political economies are related to ethnic identity in more than one sense. Earle 
(2002: 162) says that complex chiefdoms are characterised from the point of view of 
material culture by the creation of “grand styles”. These grand styles usually draw upon 
a collective symbolic reservoir which is reelaborated with foreign influences: this is the 
case of LaTène art, a “barbarian” style combined with Mediterranean motifs. This was 
created as an elite style but it became democratised in a few generations (Wells 1998: 
265-266). As another political-economic strategy, the elites appropriate themselves of 
widely respected and shared symbols and use them in their prestige material culture 
(jewels, dress, monumental architecture, arms). In this way, they situate themselves as 
guarantors of the social and cosmological order represented by those symbols—this, for 
instance, might explain the prevalence of solar symbols and swastikas in Iron Age elite 
material culture. Grand styles are very recognizable (consider the New Kingdom 
Egyptian style or the Toltec style) and they are sometimes considered an element of 
ethnic differentiation—for example, Celtic LaTène style vs. Jastorf Germanic style (see 
Wells 1998: 276 and fig. 4). They certainly help to buttress ethnic identities, but they 
are born mainly as an elite phenomenon. As it is often the case, rulers are the most 
interested in creating, showing and fostering a particular ethnic identity. This was 
probably the case with Mycenaean aristocrats (Hall 2002: 48-49) and Late Bronze Age 
elites more generally (Kristiansen 1998: 404-406). Egalitarian groups tend to have 
weaker ethnic feelings and mobilise them less frequently.  
Not all political economies are the same, though. Blanton (1998) establishes a 
useful distinction. He talks about exclusionary and corporate political economies. 
Corporate political economies curtail the power of the elites, who have to obtain more 
often the acquiescence of the community. Charles Stanish (2002) has pointed out some 
of the mechanisms, such as feasting and rituals, to which the elites resort to maintain 
their legitimacy before commoners. Corporate political economies were likely the 
dominant economy of power that prevailed in Iron Age Europe. Institutions such as 
senates, assemblies, councils, feasts, ritual specialists and magistrates not only helped to 
reproduce a ranked system, but also limited the agency of the aristocratic classes, 
redistributed social power and buttressed collective identity (Roymans 1990: 22-23; 
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Crumley 2002: 140; Woolf 2002: 11). Along with corporate political economies, 
however, other systems did exist in Iron Age Europe, where egalitarian values were 
even more emphasised (Hill 1995). The concept of moral economy is useful to define 
the economy of power at work in these societies.  
Moral economy has been a much less succesful concept in archaeology. Some 
authors have explored egalitarian ideologies, but the concept itself has not been applied 
very widely. In a sense, the idea of moral economy is the opposite of political economy. 
Whereas political economies are based on a series of links between economy and power 
that allow for social differences to be produced, moral economies, without necessarily 
supporting radically egalitarian political systems, emphasise collective values and 
isonomy. The concept of moral economy did not became usual in the social sciences 
until the 1970s. It took off then with the writings of E.P. Thomson (1971) and J.C. Scott 
(1976) among others. Moral economy refers to the essentially non-economic (in 
Western perspective) norms and obligations that mediate the central social, political and 
economic relations of a given people. Where moral economies are enforced, self-
interested calculations of gain or efficiency are absent, secondary or camouflaged. They 
stress egalitarian and collective values, which are usually channeled through myth and 
rituals, and preclude individual gain at the expense of others. Strategies at work in 
moral economies include communal landholdings, mutual aid and reciprocity, risk-
sharing and social welfare institutions. The articulation of social norms, the principles 
of reciprocity and the symbolic expression of community values intervene not only in 
the relations within the community, but also in the relations between the community and 
other groups. Therefore, it has been noted that the work of moral economies is made 
more visible in situations of cultural contact between nonmarket communities and 
market-oriented societies. Different versions of this kind of economy exist in a diverse 
array of societies, including purely egalitarian ones, transegalitarian (Hayden 1995), 
heterarchical (Crumley 2002), peasant societies (Wolf 1982) and deep rural societies 
(Jedrej 1995). However, moral economic principles can be used to restrict the rulers’ 
power in state systems as well (Blanton 1998). 
As it occurs with political economies, the ethos enforced by a moral economy 
can be fundamental in defining a particular ethnic identity. The Uduk of the Sudan, 
studied by Wendy James are a good example of this. Despite strongly disrupting forces 
(war, slavery, invasions), the Uduk have managed to maintain their ethnic cohesion 
through the implementation of a powerful moral economy. This economy restricts or 
Lo que llamas moral economy fue definido por Mauss en 1922 en su 
ensayo sobre el don recopilando informaciones conocidas por la 
etnografía desde hacía decenios… ¡ya está bien de adanismo académico 
anglosajón! Qué es bien étnico. Si a ellos les va bien así los demás no 
tenemos por qué seguir esa onda pacata y provinciana. 
Además el propio Mauss ya fue seguido por Sahlins, y estupendamente, 
y anglosajón, su versión inicial de la Economía de la Edad de Piedra es 
de 1974 y los trabajos preparatorios anteriores, ¡Basándose a su vez en 
Chayanov! También por la escuela de Polanyi, y en Alemania por 
Hasebroek, también en los años 20, que aplicaba a Weber, para explicar 
el carácter moral, y político, de la “economía” ateniense. Seguido por  
supuesto por Finley, y en Francia por Vidal-Naquet, sobre todo. 
¡Pero en qué clase de guindo académico-intelectual está esa arqueología 
anglosajona que te sirve de referencia? 
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disapproves market exchange, trade and imports (James 1979: 88) and everything that 
might be identified as greed. The Uduk show a deep aversion against calculations of 
wealth, power and other aspects related with trade: being involved in commerce means 
being commodified, transformed into a thing, enslaved (James 1979: 110). Their moral 
economy also prescribes sister exchange marriage as a way of avoiding dowry, which is 
perceived as the purchase of a human being (James 1979: 124-127). This is related to a 
widespread notion of reciprocity, a typical feature of moral economies. Egalitarian 
principles inform Uduk ethnicity: they are not something that can be detached from 
their constitution as an autonomous ethnic group. According to James (1979: 19): “They 
have developed an egalitarian and defensive ethic as a way of preserving some sense of 
worth in their predicament, a way of seeing themselves neverthless as whole men and 
women, as ‘Kwanim Pa’[i.e. Uduk]”. 
In sum, the existence of one kind of economy of power or another is something 
fundamental in defining identity in general and ethnic identity in particular. The 
relationship between power and ethnicity is enacted not only in institutions, rituals and 
social prescriptions, but also in material culture: political economies favour grand 
styles, exotic goods and luxury artefacts (Earle 2002); moral economies curtail trade 
and foster democratic technologies by means of a domestic mode of production (Sahlins 
1972: 121). 
IDENTITY AND THE ECONOMY OF POWER IN ASTURIA AND CALLAECIA. 
Layers of identity. 
The separation of Asturia and Callaecia by the Romans at the end of the 1st century BC 
and the divisions of both territories in sub-regions (Asturia Cismontana and 
Transmontana, Callaecia Lucensis and Bracarensis) owe at least as much to politics as 
to culture and ethnic identification (FIGURE 1). The Romans seemingly paid special 
attention to the moral and political economies that prevailed in these areas and, more 
generally, to the political constitution of the different communities that they 
encountered. Likewise, the locals themselves constructed their collective identity 
around concepts of power and moral knowledge. Furthermore, I would argue that these 
diverse economies of power, which were identified and to some extent sanctioned by 
the Romans, can be identified archaeologically through material culture and landscape.       
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  The distinction between Callaecians and Asturians was based on cultural and 
socio-political grounds—what philologist Javier de Hoz (1997) calls “objective 
identity” and anthropologists would denominate an “etic” perspective. The Callaecians 
shared many traits that distinguished them from neighboring peoples. Similar deities 
(like Navia, Bandua and Reve) were worshipped throughout the region (García 
Fernández-Albalat 1990; Prósper 2002); some elements of material culture were 
exclusive of different Callaecian communities (such as ritual saunas, gold torcs, 
earrings, bronze cauldrons, antennae daggers and some types of fibulae), and probably 
the same language or closely related languages were spoken all over the land (Luján 
2006). The Callaecians also shared an important socio-political element: as opposed to 
the rest of Iberia, they based their social organization on territory, settlements and 
households rather than on real or imaginary kinship ties (extended families, clans, 
lineages, gentilitates, gentes), which predominated in the rest of “Celtic” Iberia 
(González- Ruibal 2006a). This was probably a fact as important for the Callaecians to 
be perceived as a distinct group by aliens, as it was language or religion. It is not by 
chance that the inscriptions which mention castella (hillforts) almost perfectly fit the 
boundaries of Roman Callaecia—a few castella do appear in Asturia, though (Mangas 
and Olano 1995), where gentes and gentilitates were the rule. Another element with 
political implications that distinguished the Callaecians (as well as the Asturians in this 
case) from other ‘Celtic’ groups in Iberia was the absence of an equestrian elite 
(González-Ruibal 2006-2007: fig. 4.93). Equestrian elites played an outstanding role 
elsewhere in the Iberian Peninsula (Almagro Gorbea 1998;  Almagro Gorbea and Torres 
2000). 
 Nonetheless, these large groupings, which today archaeologists and historians in 
Spain tend to consider “cultures” or “ethnic groups”, could have been hardly an element 
of identification for people in the past and, given the size of the regions and the huge 
internal variability. Therefore, they were very unlikely sources of ethnic feelings. Since 
Max Weber’s definition of ethnic identity in 1922 (cf. Hall 2002: 10), most authors 
agree that self-identification—which usually presupposes a belief in a common origin—
is a fundamental aspect of ethnicity (Barth 1976: 11; Shennan 1989: 14; Hall 2002: 10-
11). Although Ruby considers that limiting ethnicity to a phenomenon of self-
identification is useless in ancient contexts (Ruby 2006: 41), he  insists that we have to 
spare the term “ethnicity” to processes of assertion of identity and the term “ethnic 
identity” to the situation created by those processes (Ruby 2006: 37). Thus, neither 
El que defiendas las sociedades de 
casa, como hiciste en tu artículo, me 
parece bien como hipótesis. Pero no 
te autoriza a esta afirmación que, 
simplemente, desconoces o 
desconocemos: ¿Qué sabemos de los 
lazos de parentesco, reales o 
imaginados? NADA 
Será por eso que los romanos reclutaban 
aquí unidades de caballería? 
Que la diadema de Moñes no se entiende 
sin los caballos? 
Que hay escenas de equitación acrobática 
en los petroglifos? 
Que los textos clásicos hablan de caballos 
y jinetes del NW? 
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Callaecians nor Asturians qualify as ethnic groups in these terms, because there is no 
evidence that they considered themselves a single collective, ever asserted a common 
identity, or had a shared origin myth—quite the opposite, as we will see. The reason for 
the absence of a shared identity among Callaecians, on the one hand, and Asturians, on 
the other, has to be explained again on political grounds. Shennan (1989: 15) 
understands ethnicity as a phenomenon tighlty linked to the emergence of the state. I do 
not think that states are indispensable, but it is obvious that state mechanisms find less 
hindrances in the creation and generalisation of large “imagined communities” 
(Anderson 1983), than small-scale or middle-range societies. Communication and 
interaction are basic elements for the maintenance of ethnic identity (Barth 1976:11) 
and these are better fulfilled in the context of centralised polities. Territories as wide 
and varied as those of Callaecia and Asturia could have hardly generated a sense of 
common ethnic belonging without the existence of a state—or several states.          
 I think that we should look at other levels to see how collective identity worked 
in ancient pre-state societies; actually, we have to look at a multiplicity of levels (Ruby 
2006: 47-54): smaller territories, valleys and hillforts were the scale at which collective 
identity was most likely played out in daily life. This has been observed 
ethnographically. For instance, local diversity notwithstanding, the Kalinga of the 
Philippines share customs, language and material culture, yet social relations, social 
organization and identity are materialised at the level of the village or the valley unit 
(Stark 1998). Kalinga identity has played a rather negligible role compared to smaller-
scale affiliations. The problem for archaeologists is that these smaller groupings seldom 
match any particular assemblage of material culture (Lemonnier 1986). Similarly, in the 
northwest of Iberia castella, gentilitates, civitates and populi likely played an important 
role in the assertion of collective identity and decision-making, but they are very 
difficult to track archaeologically or even historically, since they seldom evince any 
cultural distinctiveness (González-Ruibal 2006-2007: 456-459).  
 However, there are other collectives which are archaeologically identifiable, 
which aliens perceived very well and which were pivotal in constructing local, shared 
identities. Although the Romans noticed the similarities of the diverse Callaecian 
communities, on the one hand, and the resemblances of the many Asturian groups, on 
the other, they were aware also of their manifold internal differences. They saw a clear 
divide between south/north and plains/highlands and they expressed this divide in ethnic 
terms: Ptolemy (2, 6, 1-2, 22 and 38), for example, refers to northern Callaecians as 
Otra vez los clásicos, mira el ensayo de Durkheim  y Mauss sobre variaciones estacionales de 
los esquimales, o toda la bibliografía sobre la función de las reuniones y asambleas, también 
estacionales, de los aborígenes australianos. ¡¡¡¡ Claro que tienen identidades etnicas fuertes, 
aunque sean socialmente las sociedades más alejadas imaginables del estado!!!! 
Al contrario, distintos “estados” pueden tener identidades compartidas en alto grado en las 
etnias organizadas a partir de “ciudades estado”, en Mesopotamia, en Grecia o la Península 
Itálica. 
Te quejas de falta de una aproximación dialéctica a los problemas y caes en ella en algunas 
ocasiones. 
Sin entrar en la cuestión estado sí o no, que en realidad no me ha ocupado, el valor que 
concedo a los “santuarios” con todas las cautelas que el tema exige todavía, es el de ser esos 
lugares propicios para reuniones y, por lo tanto, para formas de sociabilidad compartida 
generadora de relaciones: identidad si quieres, pero por supuesto también políticas, 
matrimoniales, intercambios de bienes, juegos… Lo que son las ferias, vamos: y esto está 
perfectamente atestiguado en todas partes. 
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Kallaikoi Loukénsioi and to southern Callaecians as Kallaikoi Brakároi. This divide 
coincided with societies with central places (oppida) in the south and the plains and 
societies without oppida in the north and the highlands (FIGURE 2). Meaningfully, 
when the Romans organised these regions, they listed communities as civitates in the 
south and the plains (such as  Quaerquerni, Caladuni or Leuni), and as populi in the 
north and the highlands (such as Copori, Lemavi, Neri and Artabri) (Plinius, Nat. 3, 28). 
This divide was sanctioned by the Romans with the establishment of four different 
conventus. Callaecia Bracarensis and Asturia Cismontana or Augustana had oppida 
before the Roman conquest; Callaecia Lucensis and Asturia Transmontana did not. The 
societies without oppida were also diverse: some of them were more hierarchical than 
others. I propose a fourfold typology of socio-political systems that intersected ethnic 
identity. I will designate these systems—or rather, economies of power—as house 
societies, kinship-based chiefdoms, heroic societies and deep rural communities 
(FIGURE 3). What I will try to prove in the remaining of this article is that these 
differences were much more important to define collective identity, than the larger 
groupings (Callaecia, Asturia), which archaeologists tend to consider in the first place. 
Southern Callaecians and Asturians: House societies and kinship-based 
chiefdoms. 
Societies based on oppida can be divided into two large groups: house societies, that 
were predominant in southern Callaecia (Callaecia Bracarensis) and kinship-based 
chiefdoms, which dominated southern Asturia (Asturia Cismontana) and were 
widespread all over Iberia and other parts of continental Europe. What would be known 
as southern Callaecia developed more hierarchical polities, inserted in the 
Mediterranean trade networks, since the Late Bronze Age. The first fortified settlements 
of the Iberian northwest, as well as the most important and rich bronze hoards, appear in 
this region. There is, thus, a tradition of longue durée of powerful political economies 
managed by an elite with a tendency towards centralisation and long distance 
connections (González-Ruibal 2006-2007: 77-160).  
 The story is not a simple evolutionary one, but, in any case, by the end of the 
Iron Age, southern Callaecia witnessed the emergence of central places (oppida), 
controlling large territories. The appearance of large settlements, that were up to 20 
times bigger than previous hillforts amounted to a veritable revolution in the social 
construction of landscape. As society became more and more hierarchised, so did the 
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landscape. The oppida, however, were just one among many political technologies 
(sensu Michel Foucault) deployed during the Late Iron Age. Other technologies 
(FIGURE 4), whose relevance grew exponentially during this period, were collective 
ritual spaces, ritual saunas, feasts (as represented by numerous Mediterranean 
amphoras, bronze cauldrons and other banquet equipment), the control of long-distance 
trade networks, and the management of violence (war and raids). The political economy 
of southern Callaecian elites was based on these elements, but it was reproduced by 
households. The primacy of the house over the village was achieved throughout the 
second half of the first millennium BC, starting around 400 BC. Archictecture became 
more monumental and domestic units more self-contained and independent in relation 
to the rest of the settlement (Ayán Vila 2005). By the 2nd c. BC some domestic 
compounds are visibly more important than others. Through an array of strategies, 
including political and kinship alliances, the acquisition and manipulation of 
genealogies and heirlooms, the production of agricultural surplus, leadership in war and 
the acquisition of imported goods, some houses increased their power at the expense of 
others. These political-economic strategies are akin to those found in other so-called 
“house societies” (González-Ruibal 2006), which have been ethnographically and 
historically attested in different parts of the world (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995).  
 Southern Callaecians—or at least the dominant groups—seemingly developed a 
common identity, in opposition to northern Callaecians and neighbouring groups 
(Asturians, Lusitanians). This is shown, among other things, by the creation of a shared 
grand style, an “art of the oppida” (González-Ruibal 2004: 116-123). This art, restricted 
to southern Callaecia, is materialised in a diversity of media; among the most 
widespread manifestations is a distinctive architectural decoration, which drew upon a 
variety of European and Mediterranean traditions and covered with swastikas, triskels 
and geometrical friezes the houses of the powerful and religious buildings (including 
ritual saunas). The style is also evident in jewellery which shared many of the motifs 
found in scultpure: finely decorated torcs (a male adornment) and Iberian-influenced 
earrings (a female one). Other elements that reveal the existence of a widely shared 
grand style are warrior statues: oversized representations of warriors armed with the 
local panoply and dressed with elaborated garments, torcs and bracelets (Schattner 
2003).    
 The existence of a common southern Callaecian identity is also made manifest in 
their attitude towards aliens. According to Orosius (5, 5, 12), Decimus Junius Brutus 
Puede ser más complejo, pues ese estilo compartido puede 
ser obra de hablantes de disti tas l nguas, como muest a 
el análisis lingüístico de las inscripciones de Las. 
 
Por otra parte, cada vez enco tram  en petroglifos más 
motivos que seguidamente, al mismo tiempo ¿? Aparecen 
en la plástica de los castros. 
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defeated a large group of Callaeciansi, who were helping the Lusitanians, near the 
Durius river (ca. 137 BC). Even if we ignore the exaggerated number of indigenous 
casualties given by the historian (sixty thousand), the narration conveys the idea that 
Brutus routed a large group of people that fought as Callaecians, probably a 
confederation of peoples (Santos Yanguas 1988: 30). Meaningfully, the Roman general 
took the nickname “Callaicus” after his victory and was granted triumph back in Rome. 
Although it has been stated traditionally that the Callaeci were a community that 
inhabited the lower Durius river, I would not rule out the possibility of the name being 
applied at that time to all southern Callaecians (even if the name was not the name the 
Callaecians had for themselves).   
 While southern Callaecian elites resorted to the house to subvert more 
constraining collective ethics, southern Asturians, as many other groups in Iberia, were 
able to construct ranked and centralised societies—also articulated around oppida—
resorting to the language of kinship. At least, that is the impression transmitted by 
inscriptions of Roman times mentioning gentilitates and gentes, which are groups 
united by fictive or real kinship and shared origins (Alarcão 2003; González-Ruibal 
2006: 148). Although many large oppida are known in their land, southern Asturians are 
scarcely known archaeologically (Orejas 1996). We may guess that the mechanisms 
deployed by the local political economy were not dissimilar to those of southern 
Callaecia—except for the strategies more closely linked to a house system. The use of 
references of prestige coming from Mediterranean Iberia and the Celtiberian region 
(such as silver jewellery and Celtiberian-style fibulae and panoply) possibly played an 
important role in the construction of a common identity among southern Asturians and 
in the negotiation of power by the local elites, who could draw on a widespread 
aristocratic culture. 
Northern Callaecians: Heroic societies. 
Oppida are a restricted phenomenon in northwestern Iberia. It is not strange that some 
communities resisted oppida, given the far-reaching political and cultural consequences 
of the appearance of large central places. The rejection of the oppida model is not 
something unique of northern Iberia, though. A similar contrast between oppida and 
oppida-less societies can be found in the British Isles, where large centres mainly 
developed in southern England (Hill 1995a). The same occurs in central Europe (Wells 
1998: 272). Politics define landscape and both landscape and politics shape identity. 
Why not? 
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The social landscape of the societies with oppida—or against oppida, using the 
Clastrian metaphor (Clastres 1989)—is a democratic one: all hillforts have roughly the 
same size and territory is not politically hierarchised nor regionalised. This is a 
heterarchical landscape, with a multiplicity of sovereign, self-contained, autonomous 
centres or, rather, with no centres at all. Hillforts probably established alliances and 
created ever-shifting confederations (Fábrega 2005). Perhaps because of this emphasis 
on autonomy, frontiers and neutral locales had such a paramount role in the region 
(Brañas 2000: 169-177). The space between hillforts is marked by natural sacred places, 
sanctuaries with rock art, offerings in rivers, and hoards of torcs and arms. 
Meaningfully, oppida tend to incorporate sacred places inside the urban space and to 
politicise (i.e. incorporate into the pólis) rituals, whereas the societies against oppida 
maintain sanctuaries beyond the political territory ascribed to a particular hillfort.  
 Nevertheless, being against the State does not mean being against hierarchy: 
some societies without oppida in the northwest of Iberia developed political economies 
which were consistent with a lack of centralised settlements, while other groups rejected 
strong forms of inequalities altogether. I will call the first group “heroic societies”, 
following García Quintela (2002) and Parcero Oubiña (2002), and deep rural 
communities the second group. Heroic societies were ranked. They had a political 
economy with an array of strategies of differentiation. The heroic societies of Callaecia 
were characterised by a particular idea of value, which is akin to that of other “Celtic” 
communities (Brañas 2000: 17-19; García Quintela 2002: 97-98; Parcero Oubiña 2002: 
182-184). This idea of value, which can be considered a political economy, is based on 
the relevance of portable goods (like jewellery), cattle and war (FIGURE 5). This is 
clearly seen from an archaeological point of view in the absence of a strong 
architectural tradition in the area (as opposed to the house societies); the overabundance 
of jewels, most notably torcs, who cluster around northern Callaecia (Ladra 2005); the 
elaboration of defensive works in hillforts, and the presence of weapons, which is more 
marked—considering the general scarcity of these artefacts in the northwest of Iberia—
in the territory of heroic societies. Also, hillforts in northern Callaecia have usually a 
higher percentage of cow bones than those of southern Callaecia (Fernández Rodríguez 
1996: 208; González-Ruibal 2006-2007: 295). The economy of prestige goods was 
based on local artefacts, especially torcs, instead of exotic products, which are virtually 
absent in most settlements. That these communities were strongly linked to one another 
is demonstrated, among other things, by the appearance of torcs belonging to a 
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particular local style outside their region of production, probably due to elite gifts and 
raids (Ladra 2005); by the existence of a shared pottery style—that implies some sort of 
cultural transmission; and by the repetition of a particular style of ritual sauna all over 
the area (Ríos González 2000), revealing shared beliefs and similar social performances. 
These practices, along with common principles of value, probably worked as the grand 
style and the oppida in southern Callaecia in promoting a feeling of common belonging 
among the northern communities.  
Highland Asturians and Callaecians: deep rural communities.  
Whereas the kind of shared identities revealed by the appearance of grand styles has 
been discussed thoroughly, the relationship between egalitarian ethoi and identity has 
awoken much less interest among archaeologists. The interest for non-hierarchical 
forms of social organisation in the later prehistory is quite recent (Hill 1995; Fernández-
Posse and Sánchez-Palencia 1998; Sastre Prats 2002). However, it is obvious that moral 
economies were a strong source of collective self-identification in opposition to other 
Iron Age communities. These communities were in some ways like a negative of the 
societies that we have seen so far. There was a strong and pervasive egalitarian ethos 
that unified their culture and underpinned their particular regimes of power. This is not 
to say that they were pure egalitarian communities: they were not, but it is well known, 
from historical and anthropological studies, that non-egalitarian communities cover a 
wide political spectrum, from scarcely hierarchised systems to empires. It is difficult to 
find a label to define Iron Age groups which are egalitarian-leaning and do not fit the 
usual “Celtic model”, mirrored on the societies of the Early Middle Ages. Definitions 
proposed to date are problematic: they are not truly tribal or segmentarian (as proposed 
by Sastre Prats 2002), because these terms apply to more egalitarian and smaller-scale 
collectives; they are not peasants either, since this concept implies a state. Heterarchical 
(Crumley 2002) and transegalitarian (Hayden 1995) are probably more adequate terms, 
if only because they have been defined by archaeologists to tackle with these 
communities which are so difficult to define in sociopolitical terms. I would like to add 
another concept, admittedly problematic but interesting to think with: deep rural (Jedrej 
1995: 3-4). 
 Deep rural communities live in the outskirts of states and are characterised by 
cultural conservatism, the prevalence of a strong moral economy and the refusal to 
interact with strangers, especially powerful ones (merchants, missionaries, state 
Once again??? La existencia de “formas no 
jerarquizadas de organización social en Lat  
Prehistory, está perfectamente atestiguada en las 
fuentes clásicas: Varrón, sobre la agricultura II, 1, 
por ejemplo, y toda la dis usión peripatética sobre 
los modos de vida, con reflejos múltiples. Es lo que, 
por otra parte, Felipe llama los Robin Hood de las 
distintas ép cas. 
Pues con toda esta jerga lo siento pero me quedo con el modelo 
que proponía en 2002 y que implica una relación dialéctica que se 
resuelve en el tiempo y en el ceso histórico, entre formas más 
concentradas y más laxas, que no tienen porque tener que ver, al 
menos directamente, con cultura material. Un jefe puede ser 
reconocido como tal por una pandilla de muertos de hambre,  o n 
una organización más jerarquizada y con formas mas 
institucionalizadas: esto no siempre deja huella arqueológica. 
Cuál es la huella arqueológica de la preeminencia de Agamenón 
sobre los restantes caudillos aqueos? Quienes a su vez mandaban 
¡y cómo! Sobre sus inferiores. 
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representatives and the like). According to Jedrej, deep rurals “deliberately sought to 
avoid subordination by, and cultural assimilation into, the adjacent predominant peoples 
and their agents”. The situation of many egalitarian-leaning communities in Iron Age 
northern Iberia is somewhat comparable to that of many modern deep rurals. They live 
in highland peripheral regions, surrounded by more hierarchical regimes (in occasions 
state-like); they are not inserted in any major long-distance trade network and refuse 
imports and alien technologies; they are very conservative in cultural terms—their 
culture (including material culture) in the Late Iron Age is not very different from that 
of the Early Iron Age); they practise more egalitarian politics than their neighbours and 
lack an economy of prestige goods. I consider the concept deep rural to be apter than 
peasant, although their moral economies are quite similar, because even if both 
presuppose the existence of a state, peasants are incorporated into the state, whereas 
deep rurals refuse to be incorporated and resist in its margins.   
 If heroic societies rejected oppida, but constructed rank through other material 
strategies, deep rurals are suspicious of any obvious system of differentiation, at least at 
an ideological level—existing social differences were probably camouflaged. The 
archaeological markers of this economy of power are manifold (cf. Fernández-Posse 
and Sánchez-Palencia 1998; Sastre Prats 2002) (FIGURE 6): there is an almost absolute 
absence of jewels; houses are extremely similar in shape and size; there are no 
monuments (i.e. ritual saunas) where social differences can be negotiated; material 
culture is monotonous, homogeneous and produced within the household. This latter 
point is especially clear in pottery. Deep rural communities were well aware of the 
lavishly decorated pottery from southern Callaecia, because some imported vessels have 
appeared in highland hillforts (González-Ruibal 2006-2007: 486-489). However, they 
never imitated alien styles and clung to plain ware, which was more democratic, since it 
precluded differentiation between households and did not require complex techniques or 
a very specialised knowledge. The equality of the whole community is thus asserted 
through the most quotidian means. Leadership was not absent in these societies, though 
(cf. Boehm 1993). Their wide mobilisation against the Roman invasion—they even 
launched a combined offensive from the mountains (Florus, 2, 33, 33ii)—implies both 
the existence of individuals capable ot taking political decisions and establishing 
alliances, and a sense of common identity, at least in the face of an invasion.  
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From politics to ethnicity. 
These different economies of power cannot be reduced simply to politics or economy: 
on the contrary, they were crucial in generating a sense of common identity, probably 
more than religion or language. There are a few historical hints that corroborate this 
impression. Usually, external aggression is the best scenario to prove the existence of 
ethnic feelings in a particular group. Facing an alien enemy, people who belong to the 
same group usually reinforce their links and present a common front, even if they 
quarrelled or raided each other before the attack. This was certainly not the case of 
Callaecia and Asturia. At the end of the 1st century BC, the societies with oppida joined 
the Romans in the fight against their northern and highland neighbors. J.M. Roldán 
Hervás (1986: 42) states that southern Asturians were not interested in a resistance at 
any price against the Romans, because of “their greater exposure to the Roman army 
and their distrust, if not fear, of their highland kinsfolk’s attitude, born from a different 
economic regime”. As I have tried to show, it was not just a different economic regime, 
but a whole moral-economic system: a series of values, principles and social 
prescriptions that helped to construct the highlanders identity against other groups. 
Several Roman military camps were built in the middle of Asturia Cismontana (Morillo 
Cerdán 1996), revealing cooperation between southern Asturians and Romans in the 
war against the highlanders (FIGURE 7). Also, we know that the Romans respected 
southern Asturian oppidas, such as Lancia, whereas other towns, like Brigaecium, 
actively collaborated with the invaders (Florus 2, 33, 39-46).  
 A similar attitude is found in southern Callaecia. Although there is no textual 
evidence for the cooperation of Callaecians in the war against other so-called 
Callaecians, there are a few elements that might be interpreted in this way. Firstly, we 
know that the Roman war of conquest waged between 29 and 19 BC against the 
highlanders of northern Iberia mainly affected the Asturians and Cantabrians, with only 
a brief and late mention to Callaecians (Orosius 6, 21, 1). However, Callaecian 
highlanders living in the borderland with Asturia were most likely the target of the 
Roman actions as well, because they belonged to a continuum of highland peoples from 
the Basque Country to Tras-os-Montes in NE Portugal (Rodríguez Colmenero 1977: 43-
45). Actually, Strabo (Str. 3, 3, 7) described all these groups, including Callaecians, as 
hoi oreinoi, “highlanders”, and produced an ethnography that is a hotchpotch of cultural 
traits from a variety of northern communities. Secondly, the establishment of a Roman 
military camp in the would-be capital city of Lucus Augusti (Ferrer Sierra 1996; 
Y de donde sale esto???, lo diga 
Roldán o quien quiera…. 
Lewillon ha intentado hacer algo así para la Galia del momento de la 
conquista, postulando la existencia de formas políticas tendencialmente 
más proclives a Roma y otras tendencialmente más enfrentadas. 
No me resulta creíble. Me sigue pareciendo más dialéctico y dúctil mi 
modelo: en un proceso constante de acuerdos y disensiones que siguen 
dinámicas políticas internas, la aparición de Roma desencadena la 
necesidad de buscarla como aliada o como enemiga por unos u otros en 
función de sus posiciones en las querellas internas, no por una suerte de 
afinidad metafísica. Y tonto el último, por eso César nombra reyes o 
destituye reyes, o en Hispania destruyen Segeda, una polis, y fundan otras 
polis, las colonias. 
H  tratado de demostrar que no, pero 
bueno, no tiene porque ir a misa. Y lo que 
diga colmenero, sobre lo que sea, es 
prudente verificarlo por otros conductos 
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Rodríguez Colmenero 1996), in northern Callaecia, at a distance of 50 km from the 
highlands, shows that the communities of this area were very likely a military objective. 
Thirdly, the coins minted by the Roman Army to pay the soldiers involved in the 
campaign in 25-23 BC have the arms of the southern Callaecians represented on them: 
caetra (small, round shield), spear and falcata (curved sword). Meaningfully, the largest 
cluster of coins in Callaecia, apart from the Roman campsite of Lucus Augusti, is 
situated in the region of the oppida (Ferrer Sierra 1996). Therefore, we may accept that 
the oppida provided a number of warriors to fight their highland “kinsfolk”. 
 How is all this related to ethnic identities?  We do not know if the highlanders of 
Asturia and Callaecia had common origin myths or notions of a common ancestry, the 
prerequisite for the existence of an ethnic group, according to Hall (2002). We also do 
not know if the southern Callaecians had a collective ethnic name, beyond the names of 
civitates transmitted by classical sources. But if we look at their material world 
(including landscape), their economies of power and their attitudes to aliens, we may 
well say that they had (and performed) a common identity. It is obvious that living in an 
oppidum or not, having torcs or rejecting them as a symbol of status, and such trivial 
things as decorating or not decorating a pot were fundamental issues in the way they 
constructed moral knowledge, reproduced power and perceived the world and 
themselves. I do believe, with Kristiansen (1998: 406), that “a homogeneous material 
culture, whether belonging to an elite or to commoners, corresponds to a certain degree 
of ethnicity (group identification)” (my emphasis), because I believe that material 
culture is not just an accident in a people’s identity. Maybe these were not ethnic 
identities in the more usual, accepted sense, but they were identities mobilised by 
particular peoples (ethnoi) in their construction of a sense of community. The 
conquerors of Callaecia and Asturia certainly perceived and experienced that when they 
waged war against those communities and re-organised them after the conflict.  
 This situation is not unique. Talking about the Sudan in the 19th century, Charles 
Jedrej (2000: 293) says: “The polarisation of the population… into those who defied the 
government and those who submitted to its exactions was represented in contemporary 
nineteenth-century literature in geographical terms, as a distinction between mountain 
dwellers and those inhabiting the river valleys and the plains, rather than in terms of 
ethnic groups, as the writers could have done, since they were often quite aware of 
linguistic and cultural differences…”. According to the same author, “The distinction 
between highlanders and lowlanders maybe seen as an early modern transitional phase 
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from a pre-modern diversity, not of ethnic groups, but of political relations in a complex 
social organisation…” (Jedrej 2000: 294). As in Callaecia and Asturia, attitudes to 
foreigners and concepts of power were paramount for the Sudanese communities to 
define themselves. Perhaps the Callaecians, as the Bertha of the Sudan-Ethiopian 
borderland, perceived a common cultural background, but for them other identities—
which cannot be dissociated from ethnicity—were deemed more relevant. For the 
Bertha in the 19th century, being an Islamized and hierarchical Watawit was more 
important than being a Bertha (Jedrej 2004: 720). For a southern Callaecian, being an 
oppidum-dweller was more relevant in constructing his or her identity than being 
Callaecian. The question, then, is, do we always need “ethnic groups” to understand 
how collective identity worked in the past? 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this article I have tried to prove three things: 1) that ethnic identity is tightly 
interwoven with politics—not just individual politics of identity, but structural 
economies of power; 2) that spatial variations of material culture (including landscape) 
can be explained often on political grounds—different economies of power, which 
themselves help to inform a sense of ethnic belonging; 3) that collective identification 
and identity at large work at different levels: between the lower scales, which are the 
most active but also the most difficult to identify archaeologically, and the higher 
scales, which are seldom—if ever—mobilised, there are other layers of identity, in 
which common regimes of power shape identity decisively and in which material 
culture is actively involved. For illustrating these points I have resorted to the northwest 
of Iberia in the Late Iron Age. Since ancient times, two “ethnic groups” or “cultures” 
have been defined in the area: Asturians and Callaecians. A closer examination reveals 
the actual great diversity concealed under those overarching terms. 
  Archaeologists are starting to get used to tackle with complex and messy ethnic 
realities, more similar to those anthropologists and historians have to deal with. This is 
especially true for those working in colonial contexts (Van Dommelen 2006), but issues 
of identity are rarely clear-cut. The emphasis on culture contact is leaving aside the 
intricacies of ethnic identity in other contexts. In most situations, instead of rather static, 
homogeneous and well-bounded groups, we have to be ready to identify ethnic mosaics, 
patchwork states, multiple scales of collective identity and a diversity of oppositions 
and homologies that cross-cut politics and culture and generate different concepts of 
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ethnic belonging. Although I have tried to simplify a complex reality, the communities 
that I have described here were characterised by untidiness and fragmentation, with 
egalitarian-leaning communities living in the interstices of more hierarchical groups and 
a diversity of economies of power coexisting in the same space. Besides, I have focused 
on a very particular period of time—mainly the Late Iron Age, but the articulations of 
power and identity continuously changed throughout the later prehistory. The image of 
static, homogeneous and well-bounded Callaecia and Asturia is the product of a colonial 
state. States—including ancient ones—tend to render things legible in order to make 
power effective, and this implies reductionism, simplification, classification and the 
imposition of order from above (Scott 1998). Spanish scholars have seldom questioned 
the colonial gaze and have pursued an archaeology of identification, which takes for 
granted the nature of the groups transmitted by ancient authors. By comparing with 
historical and ethnographic examples, archaeologists should be able develop alternative 
conceptions of ethnicity and criticise prevailing notions of ethnic identity. This in turn 
may be useful to illuminate other contexts, including modern ones. As archaeologists, 
we should encourage a different reflection on collective identities and the role of 
material culture in enabling or constraining the production of those identities.  
 Lacking clear evidence of self-identification, common myths and ethnic names, 
the groups that I have identified in northwestern Iberia are admittedly problematic as 
ethnic communities. However, they are much closer to manifestations of ethnicity than 
to anything else, because they are shared identities that cross-cut classes or social 
groups; they are strongly associated to particular cultural and political values, and they 
“entail the reproduction of classificatory differences between people who perceive 
themselves to be culturally distinct” (Jones 1997: 85, her emphasis), if by culture we 
understand not only religion, kinship systems and language, but also social values, 
ethics and political principles. Jones (1997: 120) considers that “sensations of ethnic 
affinity are based on the recognition, at both a conscious and subconscious level, of 
similar habitual dispositions, which are embodied in cultural practices and social 
relations in which people are engaged”. Daily practice and material culture in Callaecia 
and Asturia were pivotal not only in reproducing social order, but also in creating a 
sense of common identity among similar communities and in opposition to other 
communities that did not share those fundamental values.    
Pero quién 
dice 
semejante 
cosa? 
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i
 At that time, the name Callaecian was used for those living between the Minius and Durius river, that is 
NW Portugal.  
ii
 Astures per id tempus ingentis agmine a montibus niveis descenderant.  
